

PSIHOLOGIE ȘI ȘTIINȚELE EDUCAȚIEI

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN EMOTION REGULATION GOALS AND COGNITIVE EMOTION REGULATION STRATEGIES

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Abstract. *The issue of the relationship between the goals of the emotion regulation and the emotion regulation strategies has been extremely rarely taken into consideration in an explicit way by the researchers interested in the emotion regulation domain. The present study was aimed to be a contribution in that respects, through an exploratory correlational research on 91 first year students from the University of Fine Arts and Design from Cluj-Napoca (mean age: 20 years). In order to investigate the goals of the emotion regulation, there were used an ad hoc instrument, The Questionnaire for the Emotion Regulation Goals (QERG), elaborated by the author of this study, and the questionnaire Self-Regulation of Withholding Negative Emotions (SRWNE), elaborated by Kim, Deci and Zuckerman, in 2002. The cognitive emotion regulation strategies were assessed with a Romanian version of the Cognitive Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (CERQ), elaborated by Garnefski, Kraaij and Spinhoven in 2001. Synthetically speaking,, the main result was that the preference for the cognitive emotion regulation strategies considered in the scientific literature to be adaptive and desirable (as positive reappraisal, refocus on planning, putting into perspective are) was positively associated only with the preference for some of the investigated emotion regulation goals: the autonomous goals, the goals aiming the complete elimination of an undesirable emotion, of helping the attainment of another personal goal (instrumental ones), or aiming the understanding of one's own personal affective feelings. Given the exploratory nature of the study, future research is needed in order to see which of the obtained results are accidental and which can be replicated.*

Keywords: *emotion regulation goals, cognitive emotion regulation strategies, emotion regulation*

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Until now, the issue of the relationship between the goals of the emotion regulation and the emotion regulation strategies has been extremely rarely taken into consideration in an explicit way by the researchers interested in the emotion

regulation domain, as one may note if she/he reviews the scientific literature with a higher visibility from this domain. Rusk, Tamir and Rothbaum (2011) studied the association between the performance (when one tries to “prove one’s ability to manage emotions”) vs. learning (when one seeks “to improve one’s ability to manage emotions”) goals in emotion regulation and two defensive emotion regulation strategies (rumination and thought suppression) vs. one constructive emotion regulation strategy (cognitive reappraisal). Their results indicated that the preference for performance goals in emotion regulation correlated positively with the preference for rumination and thought suppression, as defensive strategies, whereas the preference for learning goals in emotion regulation correlated positively with the preference for the cognitive reappraisal strategy, as a constructive strategy. This type of correlations was studied also by Fredericks, Uliaszek and Daros (2017), introducing another distinction in what regards the goals of the emotion regulation: natural (performance or learning goals as personality traits) vs. imposed (performance or learning goals imposed by an external situation) goal orientation, and highlighting the importance of considering the natural goal orientation when examining the effects of an imposed goal orientation on the emotion regulation. They assessed the use of four emotion regulation strategies: rumination, avoidance, problem-solving, and reappraisal as a response to experimental visual stimuli inducing a negative affect in two conditions: when a performance goal was imposed vs. when a learning goal was imposed for the regulation of the negative emotion elicited by those stimuli. Their results indicated that for the avoidance and reappraisal strategies, the main effects of the natural, imposed goal orientations, and their interaction were not significant. For the rumination and problem-solving strategies, only the effect of the interaction between the natural and the imposed goal orientations was significant. In the case of rumination, no significant difference occurred in its use for the condition in which performance goal orientation was imposed between the participants with different natural goal orientations, but for the condition in which the learning goal orientation was imposed, rumination was used less frequently by those with a natural performance goal orientation (i.e. when the natural and imposed goal orientations were incongruent) than by the ones with a natural learning goal orientation (i.e. when the natural and imposed goal orientations were congruent). In the case of the problem-solving strategy, when the imposed goal orientation was congruent with the natural one (i.e., both were of a performance or of a learning type), problem-solving was used more frequently.

Millgram, Joormann, Huppert and Tamir (2015) focused on the association between emotion regulation goals aiming the increase of happiness vs. increase of sadness and two emotion regulation strategies: situation selection (i.e., the selection of the stimuli that can trigger the desired emotions) and cognitive reappraisal, in the case of depressed vs. nondepressed participants. The results obtained by them in three studies showed that “regardless of how well depressed people implement

emotion-regulation strategies, they choose to implement them in a direction that is likely to maintain or increase sadness rather than alleviate it” in comparison with nondepressed people (Millgram et al., 2015, p.11). The association between short-term (hedonic, in which emotion regulation strategies are used “to feel less negative or more positive in the near or immediate term”) vs. long-term (instrumental, in which emotion regulation strategies are used in order to accomplish other long-term goals, affected by the current emotional state, even if this means tolerating negative emotions or modulation of positive emotions) goals in emotion regulation and distraction (“early disengagement from emotional information before it is represented and processed in working memory”) vs. cognitive reappraisal emotion regulation strategies was studied by Sheppes et al. (2014, p. 8) in different contexts (with low vs. high intensity negative emotional stimuli, to be encountered only once vs. several times). The participants were instructed to adopt one of the two above-mentioned types of emotion regulation goals and then to choose the corresponding strategies for that goal. Sheppes et al. (2014, p. 9) found that forming a long-term instrumental goal increased reappraisal choice, both for the relatively low and high intensity emotional stimuli, whereas forming a hedonic, short-term, goal predominantly increased cognitive reappraisal for low-emotional intensity stimuli and distraction for high-emotional intensity stimuli. Cognitive reappraisal was increasingly chosen when participants assumed that they will be exposed more than once to an emotional stimulus, receiving the goal to improve their mood in the long term. In other words, the cited authors show that long-term affective adaptation requires “attending to and understanding emotional events” (p. 9), implicitly cognitive reappraisal.

In another empirical research, McRae, Ciesielski and Gross (2012) studied the effectiveness of the reappraisal strategy of emotion regulation (measured using the reported emotional experience and the electrodermal responding) dependent on two emotion regulation goals (aiming to increase positive emotion vs. decrease negative emotion as a response to a negative stimulus) and the tactics used in order to implement that strategy. Their results indicated that the studied strategy was implemented in the service of the two different emotion regulation goals by using different tactics, with different outcomes (e.g., “the goal of increasing positive emotion led to greater increases in positive affect and smaller decreases in skin conductance than the goal of decreasing negative emotion”, p.250).

Finally, Gross’ (2001) process model in what respects the emotion regulation strategies could be interpreted as recognizing implicitly that some emotion regulation strategies are used in order to accomplish a prevention goal in what respects emotion regulation, namely to impede the occurrence of an unwanted emotion (i.e., those strategies associated with the first phase of emotion generation), whereas other strategies are used for accomplishing the goal of modifying an unwanted emotion after its actual occurrence (in the last phase of the emotion elicitation, when an emotion is completely generated).

Not only the relationship between the emotion regulation goals and strategies has been rather poorly studied, but also, surprisingly, the emotion regulation goals themselves have been rather ignored (as it is also noted by Gross, in 1998), being less intensively investigated, the main focus in the emotion regulation research being almost exclusively the issue of the emotion regulation strategies and their relationship with some psychopathological conditions. Theoretically speaking, the main contributions, having a synthetic character, in what respects the emotion regulation goals were those of the works of Gross (1998, 2015), Koole (2009), Koole, Van Dillen and Sheppes (2011), Sheppes and Gross (2012), Sheppes (2014), Tamir (2009, 2016), and Webb, Schweiger Gallo, Miles, Gollwitzer and Sheeran (2012), in which several important distinctions were introduced: between hedonic vs. instrumental, performance vs. learning, short-term vs. long-term goals, specific vs. general, less salient vs. more salient, less vs. more focal, active vs. passive, intrinsic (internal, natural) vs. extrinsic (external, imposed) goals in emotion regulation. Gross (2015) notes that the goals of emotion regulation can be the change of the intensity, duration, or quality of an affective feeling. Martini (2011) proposed another distinction: between self- and other-oriented emotion regulation goals, and showed that the preference for self-oriented emotional regulation goals is associated more with the situation in which emotion regulation occurs in the presence of authority figures. Also Von Scheve (2012), based on an older research (Hochschild, 1979) regarding the notion of emotional work (a notion similar with the emotion regulation one, defined by the cited author as “the act of trying to change in degree or quality an emotion or feeling”, p.561), was interested in the importance of the social dimension in what respects the emotion regulation goals, supporting the view that they are essentially shaped by emotion norms (i.e., feeling rules that “specify which emotions are regarded as appropriate and expected in particular situations”, or, in other words, prescriptive social norms that “demarcate the intensity, direction, duration, and objects of emotions appropriate in a situation”), which are highly specific to various social and institutional contexts. In his view, such social contexts can constrain the freedom in choosing emotion regulation goals, not only through social norms, but also because of the “systematic and unequal distribution” in society of the required resources for some emotion regulation strategies. He also notes that “the desire for social conformity, maintenance of cooperation, circumvention of material sanctions or social exclusion, and averting negative emotions such as shame and embarrassment are amongst the most frequently mentioned reasons for emotion regulation” (in the second paragraph from “Emotion Norms” section) and, implicitly, for obeying the feeling rules. Feeling rules are seen to be operational, in accordance with Hochschild’s view (1979), as expectations of how one usually or normally would feel in a specific situation (based on one’s or others’ previous experiences) or as social expectations in what respects what one should feel in that situation (based on social prescriptions). As another possible reason or goal for emotion regulation,

Von Scheve (2012) mentions the “emotional dissonance” or “emotional deviance”, defined as the tension generated by the discrepancy between “socially expected emotions and actually experienced emotions”, which should be decreased through emotion work or regulation, because, in the long run, it could lead to the risk of “alienation” from one’s own feelings, a “feeling” that may provide yet another goal for emotion regulation, its avoidance. Jansz and Timmers (2002) see emotional dissonance from another perspective, as a feeling of unease that occurs when someone evaluates an emotional experience as a threat to his or her identity” (p. 79), which also could provide a reason for emotion regulation. Finally, because feeling rules are situation-specific, Von Scheve (2012) notes that obeying them would provide goals for emotion regulation for which regulatory strategies that aim at situation selection or modification would be less suited. The influence of the cultural factors in what respects emotion regulation has been investigated in a series of studies from a cross-cultural perspective in which the independence-interdependence dimension was highlighted, with the accompanying distinction between socially engaging or disengaging emotions (De Leersnyder, Boiger & Mesquita, 2013; Mesquita & Albert, 2007; Mesquita, De Leersnyder & Albert, 2014; Novin, Rieffe & Mo, 2010; Shao, Doucet & Caruso, 2015; Shuman, 2013; Trommsdorff & Heikamp 2013). Such studies suggest that the goals of the emotion regulation can be shaped also by the cultural factors that place an accent on individual independence vs. collective interdependence.

The social factor was taken into account, too, by Hwang (2006), who, based on ideas from the psychoanalytic tradition and from the attachment theory, proposes yet another distinction between the emotion regulation goals: goals of the primary emotion regulation process vs. goals of the secondary emotion regulation process. In his view, the goal of the primary emotional regulation processes is to attain social desirability, by expressing, suppressing, or reappraising emotions, “depending upon the intensity of emotion and the acceptability of the emotion in the situation” (p. 19). For the secondary emotion regulation process, the goal is to repair the emotional distress “transferred from suppressing negative emotions in the primary process for social desirability” through “adaptive or maladaptive strategies based on the attachment system”, a goal chosen based also on the available cognitive resources (Hwang, 2006, p. 21).

Gross (1998) highlights the idea that emotion regulation goals may vary by emotion, that some emotions may be more regulated than others, depending on cultural or individual norms, and that their saliency can be changed during one’s life time. He notes also, along with other authors, that the goals of emotion regulation cannot be reduced to hedonistic goals (avoid pain and seek pleasure), emotion regulation involving also goals like “increasing or initiating negative emotions and decreasing or stopping positive emotions” (p. 286), as it was also shown by Parrott (1993), Tamir and Ford (2012), and Joshanloo and Weijers (2014).

From the perspective of the variation in the intensity of an emotion in its regulation, Sheppes and Gross (2012) note that the goal of emotion regulation could be to down-regulate (decrease), to prolong or maintain, or to up regulate (increase) an emotional response.

The emotion regulation goals were also differentiated based on their level of conscious representation, leading to a new distinction, between explicit (“deliberate and consciously perceived”) and implicit (“activated outside of an individual’s awareness”) emotion-regulatory goals (Sheppes & Gross, 2012). The issue of the implicit, automatic, regulation of emotions through primed or unconscious goals has been investigated by Braunstein, Gross and Ochsner (2017), Hopp, Troy and Mauss (2011), Koole and Rothermund (2011), Mauss, Bunge and Gross (2007), Mauss, Cook and Gross (2007), Webb, Totterdell and Ibar (2015), as well as by Williams, Bargh, Nocera and Gray (2009). For example, Williams et al. (2009) obtained results that indicate the existence of such unconscious emotion-regulatory goals, which are activated by cues from certain specific situations or by some emotion regulation strategies.

Gallo, Keil, McCulloch, Rockstroh and Gollwitzer (2009) brought into discussion the issue of forming implementation intentions (i.e., if-then plans, which “spell out when, where, and how a set goal is to be put into action”, “linking a critical situation with a goal-directed behavior”, based “on a single mental act”, i.e. not as “the result of frequent and consistent goal-directed responding to the same situation”, p.12, 28), as a “self-regulation strategy that furthers the degree of automaticity of goal striving” (p. 27) in what regards emotion regulation. Their empirical results indicated that “adding implementation intentions to emotion-regulation goals would make these goals more effective” (Gallo et al., 2009, p. 27). They showed that forming goal intentions for emotion regulation lacks effectiveness in comparison with forming implementation intentions for those goals. Gallo et al. (2009, p.27) conclude that “self-regulation by goal intentions is rather slow and effortful” and thus runs into problems when the goal is to downregulate immediate and strong emotions. By contrast, in their view, self-regulation through implementation intentions is automatized, quick and less effortful. So, it might be important, when considering the relationship between emotion regulation goals and strategy that the issue of the implementations intentions for those goals to be taken into consideration, as it was also noted by Webb et al. (2012).

Based on the Self-Determination Theory, Kim, Deci and Zuckerman (2002) identified several categories of reasons for self-regulating negative emotions, and developed an instrument for assessing the preference for such reasons for regulating negative emotions (described below). Those reasons might be interpreted also as emotion regulatory goals of two types: autonomous vs. heteronomous goals.

Another category of emotion regulatory goals might be the ones linked with the criteria or standards set for attaining primary emotion regulatory goals or with the tolerance thresholds in admitting certain undesirable emotions, i.e. the criteria to be met in order to trigger an emotional regulatory process. It is a category of

emotion regulatory goals that has been not taken into account explicitly and extensively, to my knowledge, in the scientific literature (the threshold issue is treated in a certain degree, rather implicitly only by Gross, in his work from 2015).

In what respects the origin of the emotional goals, besides the social factors implicitly treated above, Koole, Van Dillen and Sheppes (2011) highlight the importance of one's "beliefs about the utility of particular emotional states" (p. 29), which could be derived from verbal instructions, external influences, or abstract theories developed by people in what respects emotion regulation. As a consequence, they support the view that "when people believe that the utility of other emotional states is higher than the utility of their present emotional state, this may give rise to goal-oriented emotion regulation" (p. 29). The cited authors also distinguish between two other different sources for emotion regulation goals, placed at levels inferior or superior to the one of the conscious goals: basic needs vs. the functioning of the whole person ("person-oriented emotion regulation", p. 31). The first source refers essentially to the basic hedonic need "to seek pleasure and avoid pain", which is linked by Koole et al. (2011) with the Freudian pleasure principle, a kind of emotion regulation driven initially by "elementary, sublinguistic processes" (p. 30), and favored by the emotional distress. The second source refers to "integrated feelings or intuitions" emerged from the "integrated networks of personality systems", "closely connected with the autonomic nervous system" (p. 31). At its turn, person-oriented emotion regulation contributes to the coordination of the functioning of the whole person, preventing people "from becoming trapped in specific motivational-emotional states", or promoting "coherence in personality functioning and personal growth" (Koole et al., 2011, p. 31). The cited authors see this kind of person-oriented emotion regulation as linked with the "existential/humanistic approaches to personality", Asian philosophy and many religious traditions. Another source of emotion regulation different from the one based on conscious goals, taken into consideration by Koole et al. (2011), is the process of counterregulation, a "process whereby people switch their attention toward emotional states that are opposite in valence to emotional states that are momentarily activated" (p. 31), which confers flexibility to the emotional functioning.

Gross (2015) indicates another category of beliefs important in generating emotion regulation goals: beliefs regarding the immutability of the emotions. The cited author posits that, in the case one believes that her/his emotions cannot be changed, the goals for regulating emotions would have a weak activation, leading to regulation failures.

The preference for some emotion regulation goals may be linked also with the familiarity of certain emotions, as it is shown by Ford and Tamir (2014), who obtained data indicating that "for both pleasant and unpleasant emotions, people more (vs. less) familiar with an emotion also wanted to experience it more" (p. 311), in part because those familiar emotions may have an instrumental value. The same familiarity factor, important in determining the preference for feeling a certain emotion, may be linked also with the personal identity and self-esteem, as it was indicated by Wood, Heimpel,

Manwell and Whittington (2009). Finally, the usefulness of some emotions in particular contexts may be another factor explaining the generation of some emotion regulation goals, as it was shown by Cohen and Andrade (2004) and Tamir, Bigman, Rhodes, Salerno and Schreier (2015).

The present study was aimed to be a contribution in what respects the empirical investigation of the association between the emotion regulation goals and strategies in a more systematic way, by taken into consideration a more emotion regulation goals and strategies than the ones considered in the past research. The empirical investigation of this association could be important from a pragmatic point of view, in order to improve the educational and therapeutic programs regarding emotion regulation, which currently do not take into account a possible incompatibility between the emotion regulatory goals of those following such programs and the emotion regulation strategies trained or promoted by them. Moreover, consideration should be given also to the idea that some psychopathologies linked with emotional dysregulation could originate not so much in the preference for certain emotion regulation strategies, but rather in the preference for certain emotion regulation goals that, depending on the conditions of their attainment or nonattainment, could lead to new, secondary, emotions towards the regulated or dysregulated emotions (meta-emotions), with the risk of falling in some vicious circles (see Mitmansgruber, Beck, Höfer & Schüßler, 2009), in which, for example, the failure in the regulation of some negative emotions generates new negative emotions, exacerbating the former ones and so on.

Because I did not find in the scientific literature an available complex instrument for assessing emotion regulation goals, I constructed such an ad hoc instrument (a questionnaire). I tried to incorporate in it as many distinctions from the ones encountered in the scientific literature as possible in what respects the explicit emotion regulatory goals, without referring to particular situations or detailed categories of goals, placing them at a rather abstract level. In order to avoid that the constructed questionnaire to be even longer than it is, I dedicated only a single item for each identified explicit goal for emotion regulation, requiring a separate answer for the positive and, respectively, negative affective feelings, although, maybe, it would have been preferable to construct a scale with several items for each goal. When assessing the preference for a certain type of emotion regulation goals, there was taken into account also the intention to undertake some course of action in order to attain that goal, as a sign for its level of preference and of its effectiveness (as in the work cited above regarding the implementation intentions). Items were included for those cases in which a respondent chooses not to regulate her/his affective feelings or their expression. The questionnaire includes also items (which were not analyzed in the present research) for the assessment of the level of discontent, dissatisfaction, in what respects one's own affective feelings and their expression on several dimensions (with an item for each dimension), as well as items for the self-assessment of the global success obtained

in the regulation of one's own affective feelings and their expression in the desired directions and of the personal beliefs that emotions can be self-regulated.

In order to concurrently validate, at least partially, the above-mentioned instrument, I used another instrument (the only one for which data were provided in what respects some of its psychometric qualities), which can be interpreted as assessing some of the possible goals when regulating negative emotions, the ones that are placed on the autonomy-heteronomy dimension. This instrument is the questionnaire Self-Regulation of Withholding Negative Emotions: SRWNE, an instrument elaborated by Kim, Deci and Zuckerman, in 2002. In order to assess the emotion regulation strategies, I used the Cognitive Emotion Regulation Questionnaire, elaborated by Garnefski, Kraaij and Spinhoven in 2001, one of the most frequently used in the scientific literature dedicated to the emotion regulation issue, an instrument that is aimed to assess only the cognitive strategies for the regulation of the negative emotions. Given the exploratory purpose of the present research, no hypotheses were formulated in what respects certain specific associations between the investigated emotion regulation goals and strategies.

METHOD

The study is correlational.

Participants: 91 first year students from the University of Fine Arts and Design from Cluj-Napoca (mean age: 20 years, 68 female, 20 male, 3 without a specified gender).

Instruments

– **The Questionnaire for the Emotion Regulation Goals (QERG**, see Annex 1 for its Romanian and English versions), elaborated especially for this research by its author, as an ad hoc instrument. The questionnaire has 38 items, constructed based on a deductive method (a theoretical analysis of the investigated phenomenon): 9 items for assessing the self-reported level of satisfaction in what respects the respondent's affective feelings and their expression on several dimensions (intensity, duration, frequency, and type), 16 items for assessing the preference for the investigated goals in the regulation of the affective feelings, 10 items for assessing the preference for the investigated goals of emotional expression regulation, 2 items for the assessment of the self-reported level of global success in emotional regulation (one for the emotional subjective feeling regulation, and one for the emotional expression regulation), and one item for assessing the self-reported level of belief that emotions can be self-regulated. For each item, the answers are given on a 7-point Likert scale, with two versions (one from 0: "not at all" to 6: "extremely much", and another from -3: "strong disagreement" to 3: "strong agreement"). For 33 items, the answers are given separately for the positive and, respectively, negative emotions.

– **Self-Regulation of Withholding Negative Emotions (SRWNE)**, see Annex 2 for its Romanian version), elaborated by Kim et al. (2002), its psychometric properties (reliability and validity) being studied in the cited work. It was translated into Romanian by the author of this research. It has four scales: external regulation (7 items), introjected regulation (8 items), identified regulation (8 items), and integrated regulation (5 items), the answers for all items being given on a 7-point Likert scale (from 1: “strong disagreement” to 7: “strong agreement”). The four scales have a relatively good internal consistency (the Cronbach’s α coefficient varying between .67 și .78), the data obtained by the cited authors supporting also their validity.

– **Cognitive Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (CERQ)**, elaborated by Garnefski et al. in 2001, translated into Romanian by the author of this research, and administrated in this version. It is a questionnaire with nine subscales, with a total of 36 items (4 items for each subscale), for which the answers were given on a 5-point Likert scale [from 1: “(almost) never” to 5: “(almost) always”], which “refers exclusively to an individual’s thoughts after having experienced a negative event” (Garnefski, Kraaij and Spinhoven, 2002, p. 5). The nine subscales are: self-blame, other-blame, rumination, catastrophizing, acceptance, positive refocusing, refocus on planning, positive reappraisal, putting into perspective. Garnefski and Kraaij (2007) report an internal consistency coefficient α for the subscales that varies between .68 and .86, and a test-retest reliability between .48 (refocus on planning) and .65 (other-blame).

Procedure: The three instruments were administered collectively. Two of them (CERQ and QERG) were administered successively, without a break between them, within the same session, in the following order: CERQ and QERG. SRWNE was administered in another session, after 4 weeks. For the SRWNE questionnaire, a score was computed for each of the four scales (by averaging the answers for that scale), a composite score for the controlled regulation (as a sum of the standardized scores - for which m și σ were for this sample - of the external and introjected regulation scales: the controlled index CI), a composite score for the autonomous regulation (as a sum of the standardized scores of the identified and integrated regulation scales: the autonomy index AI), and a composite score for the relative autonomous regulation (created by subtracting the CI from the AI: the relative autonomy index RAI). For each scale of CERQ, a score was computed as a sum of the answers for the items of that scale.

RESULTS

In the first place, the internal consistency Cronbach’s alpha coefficients for the CERQ scales were computed for the sample of this research and this Romanian version of the CERQ. They were for the self-blame scale: $\alpha = .794$, acceptance scale: $\alpha = .559$, rumination scale: $\alpha = .558$, positive refocusing: $\alpha = .725$, refocus

on planning: $\alpha = .688$, positive reappraisal: $\alpha = .750$, putting into perspective: $\alpha = .697$, catastrophizing: $\alpha = .696$, and other-blame: $\alpha = .616$. The internal consistency Cronbach's alpha coefficients were computed also for the SWRNE scales, in this Romanian version. They were for the external regulation scale: $\alpha = .707$, for the introjection regulation scale: $\alpha = .711$, for the identified regulation scale: $\alpha = .707$, for the integrated regulation scale: $\alpha = .613$, for the controlled regulation scale: $\alpha = .821$, and for the autonomous regulation scale: $\alpha = .775$.

For the computed correlations, a statistical significance threshold of $p = .05$ was chosen. As the distribution of many of the investigated variables was significantly departed from the normal distribution, the non-parametric Spearman rank correlation was used for exploring the associations between them. The number of participants for each correlation varies, because the three questionnaires were not integrally completed by all the participants, and because in the second session some of the participants forgot their pseudonym from the first session.

I. *The rank correlation Spearman (one-sided) between the scores for the SRWNE (Self-Regulation of Withholding Negative Emotions) scores and the answers for the items 26-35 from QERG (the ones referring to the expression of the negative emotions):*

– of the answer for *item 27* (“First I aim and undertake something to change the way I express my affective feelings so that it is in agreement with what I think that it would be suitable in the context in which I find myself”) with the *score of the scale for the emotion regulation through autonomous identification* with the goals valorised by one's own community (*identified regulation*): $\rho = .235$, $p = .048$, $N = 51$, as well as with the composite *score for the autonomous emotion regulation (AI)*: $\rho = .239$, $p = .047$, $N = 50$;

– of the answer for *item 29* (“First I aim and undertake something to change the way in which I express my affective feelings so that it is in agreement with the way I believe that most of those around me express or would express them in a similar context.”) with the *score of the scale for introjected emotion regulation* (through a partial internalization of the external control, the goal being to avoid the guilt or shame feelings): $\rho = .360$, $p = .006$, $N = 49$, as well as with the composite *score of controlled emotion regulation (CI)*: $\rho = .268$, $p = .033$, $N = 49$;

– of the answer for *item 30* (“First I aim and undertake something to change the way in which I express my affective feelings so that it is in agreement with the image I have about myself.”) with the *score of the scale for the emotion regulation through autonomous identification* with the goals valorised by one's own community (*identified regulation*): $\rho = .292$, $p = .017$, $N = 53$, with the *score of the scale for the integrated emotion regulation* (through a complete internalization of the external control, accompanied by the feeling of the free choice of one's own affective feelings, which are used flexibly to support the autonomous action):

$\rho = .330$, $p = .009$, $N = 51$, as well as with composite score for the autonomous emotion regulation (AI): $\rho = .354$, $p = .005$, $N = 51$;

– of the answer for item 32 (“First I aim and undertake something to change the way in which I express my affective feelings so that it would help me to achieve the goals that I set for myself.”) with the composite score of relative autonomous regulation (the relative autonomy index: RAI): $\rho = .256$, $p = .041$, $N = 47$ (the positive correlations between the answer for the item 32 and the scores for the two scales for the autonomous regulation, and, respectively, the composite score for the autonomous emotion regulation were relatively close to the chosen statistical significance threshold of $p = .05$);

– of the answer for item 33 (“First I aim and undertake something to change the way in which I express my affective feelings so that the goals that I set for myself to be unimpeded by their expression.”) with the score for the regulation of the negative emotions through autonomous identification with the goals valorised by one’s own community (identified regulation): $\rho = .280$, $p = .023$, $N = 51$ (the positive correlations between the answer for the item 33 and the composite scores for the autonomous regulation, and, respectively, the relative autonomous regulation were relatively close to the chosen statistical significance threshold of $p = .05$);

– of the answer for item 35 (“I let the expression of my affective feelings to be a spontaneous one, without trying to change it in any way.”) with the score for the external regulation of negative emotions: $\rho = -.249$, $p = .046$, $N = 47$, with the one for the introjected regulation: $\rho = -.461$, $p = .001$, $N = 46$, as well as with the composite score for the controlled emotion regulation (CI): $\rho = -.350$, $p = .009$, $N = 45$.

The one-sided significance test was used for these correlations, because there were expected positive correlations between the answers for the QERG items and the computed scores for the SRWNE scales that have a similar meaning to those items, and negative correlations in the case in which that meaning of the SRWNE scales was in opposition with the meaning of the QERG items.

II. *The rank correlation Spearman (two-sided) between the scores for the CERQ (for the emotion regulation strategies) and the scores for the SRWNE (Self-Regulation of Withholding Negative Emotions, assessing the degree of autonomy of the motivations to regulate negative emotions):*

– The CERQ score for the other-blame emotion regulation strategy did not correlate significantly with any of the SRWNE scores;

– The CERQ score for the emotion regulation strategy of catastrophizing correlated positively with the SRWNE score for the introjected regulation of the expression of negative feelings (which aims to avoid shame and guilt): $\rho = .294$, $p = .036$, $N = 51$;

– The CERQ score for the emotion regulation strategy of putting into perspective correlated positively with the SRWNE score for the introjected regulation of the expression of negative feelings (which aims to avoid shame and guilt): $\rho = .339$, $p = .016$, $N = 50$;

– The *CERQ* score for the emotion regulation strategy of positive reappraisal correlated positively with

- the *SRWNE* score for the identified regulation (which has as a goal the identification with the values of one's own community): $\rho = .341$, $p = .013$, $N = 53$;
- the *SRWNE* score for the integrated regulation (i.e., flexible regulation that aims to attain autonomous actions): $\rho = .294$, $p = .035$, $N = 52$;
- the *SRWNE* composite score for the autonomous regulation: $\rho = .354$, $p = .01$, $N = 51$;

– The *CERQ* score for the emotion regulation strategy of refocus on planning correlated positively with the *SRWNE* score for the integrated regulation (i.e., flexible regulation that aims to attain autonomous actions): $\rho = .286$, $p = .038$, $N = 53$;

– The *CERQ* score for the emotion regulation strategy of positive refocusing correlated positively with

- the *SRWNE* score for the external regulation (with the goal of submitting oneself to the external control): $\rho = .317$, $p = .023$, $N = 51$;
- the *SRWNE* composite score for the controlled regulation: $\rho = .302$, $p = .035$, $N = 49$;

– The *CERQ* score for the emotion regulation strategy of rumination correlated positively with

- the *SRWNE* score for the integrated regulation (i.e., flexible regulation that aims to attain autonomous actions): $\rho = .348$, $p = .012$, $N = 52$;
- the *SRWNE* composite score for the autonomous regulation: $\rho = .293$, $p = .035$, $N = 52$;

– The *CERQ* score for the emotion regulation strategy of acceptance correlated positively with

- the *SRWNE* score for the integrated regulation (i.e., flexible regulation that aims to attain autonomous actions): $\rho = .423$, $p = .002$, $N = 52$;
- the *SRWNE* composite score for the autonomous regulation: $\rho = .335$, $p = .015$, $N = 52$;

– The *CERQ* score for the emotion regulation strategy of self-blame correlated positively with

- the *SRWNE* score for the external regulation (with the goal of submitting oneself to the external control): $\rho = .378$, $p = .026$, $N = 52$;
- the *SRWNE* score for the introjected regulation (which aims to avoid shame and guilt): $\rho = .431$, $p = .001$, $N = 52$;
- the *SRWNE* composite score for the controlled regulation: $\rho = .302$, $p = .035$, $N = 49$;
- the *SRWNE* score for the identified regulation (which has as a goal the identification with the values of one's community): $\rho = .464$, $p < .001$, $N = 54$;

- the SRWNE score for the integrated regulation (i.e., flexible regulation that aims to attain autonomous actions): $\rho = .263$, $p = .057$, $N = 53$;
- the SRWNE composite score for the autonomous regulation: $\rho = .403$, $p < .001$, $N = 53$.

III.a. *The rank correlation Spearman (two-sided) between the scores for the CERQ (for the cognitive emotion regulation strategies) and the answers for the QERG items referring to the goals in the regulation of the negative affective feelings:*

– The CERQ score for the self-blame emotion regulation strategy correlated positively significantly or relatively close to the chosen statistical significance threshold with the answer for the QERG items 10 ($\rho = .246$, $p = .036$, $N = 73$), 11 ($\rho = .201$, $p = .084$, $N = 75$), 12 ($\rho = .206$, $p = .076$, $N = 75$), 16 ($\rho = .219$, $p = .011$, $N = 73$), 19 ($\rho = .288$, $p = .013$, $N = 74$), **21 ($\rho = .357$, $p = .002$, $N = 74$)**, 23 ($\rho = .200$, $p = .091$, $N = 71$);

– The CERQ score for the emotion regulation strategy of acceptance correlated positively relatively close to the chosen statistical significance threshold with the answer for the QERG item 23 ($\rho = .220$, $p = .067$, $N = 70$);

– The CERQ score for the emotion regulation strategy of rumination correlated positively significantly with the answers for the QERG items 16 ($\rho = .266$, $p = .024$, $N = 72$), **23 ($\rho = .376$, $p = .001$, $N = 71$)**, 24 ($\rho = .256$, $p = .032$, $N = 70$);

– The CERQ score for the emotion regulation strategy of positive refocusing correlated negatively significantly with the answer for the QERG item 20 ($\rho = -.239$, $p = .039$, $N = 75$);

– The CERQ score for the emotion regulation strategy of refocus on planning correlated positively significantly or relatively close to the chosen statistical significance threshold with the answer for the QERG items 10 ($\rho = .245$, $p = .037$, $N = 73$), 11 ($\rho = .285$, $p = .013$, $N = 75$), 12 ($\rho = .257$, $p = .026$, $N = 75$), **13 ($\rho = .316$, $p = .006$, $N = 73$)**, 14 ($\rho = .297$, $p = .011$, $N = 72$), 16 ($\rho = .234$, $p = .046$, $N = 73$), 23 ($\rho = .204$, $p = .086$, $N = 72$), 24 ($\rho = .217$, $p = .069$, $N = 71$);

– The CERQ score for the emotion regulation strategy of positive reappraisal correlated significantly or relatively close to the chosen statistical significance threshold with the answer for the QERG items 10 ($\rho = .198$, $p = .096$, $N = 72$), **13 ($\rho = .343$, $p = .003$, $N = 72$)**, 17 ($\rho = -.197$, $p = .098$, $N = 72$), 22 ($\rho = .251$, $p = .033$, $N = 72$), **23 ($\rho = .386$, $p = .001$, $N = 71$)**, 24 ($\rho = .205$, $p = .088$, $N = 70$);

– The CERQ score for the emotion regulation strategy of putting into perspective correlated significantly or relatively close to the chosen statistical significance threshold with the answer for the QERG items **13 ($\rho = .396$, $p = .001$, $N = 73$)**, 14 ($\rho = .230$, $p = .054$, $N = 71$), 16 ($\rho = .260$, $p = .027$, $N = 72$), 17 ($\rho = -.201$, $p = .093$, $N = 71$), 19 ($\rho = .209$, $p = .076$, $N = 73$), 22 ($\rho = .252$, $p = .034$, $N = 71$), 24 ($\rho = .260$, $p = .031$, $N = 69$), **25 ($\rho = -.409$, $p < .000$, $N = 72$)**;

- The *CERQ* score for the emotion regulation strategy of catastrophizing correlated positively significantly with the answers for the *QERG* items 17 ($\rho = .274$, $p = .018$, $N = 72$), **18** ($\rho = .299$, $p = .01$, $N = 72$), 20 ($\rho = .291$, $p = .011$, $N = 76$);
- The *CERQ* score for the other-blame emotion regulation strategy correlated negatively significantly with the answer for the *QERG* item 23 ($\rho = -.257$, $p = .029$, $N = 72$).

III.b. *The rank correlation Spearman (two-sided) between the scores for the CERQ (for the cognitive emotion regulation strategies) and the answers for the QERG items referring to the goals in the regulation of the **expression** of the negative affective feelings:*

- The answer for the *QERG* item 26 (“First I aim and undertake something to change the way in which I express my affective feelings so that they are less visible.”) correlated positively significantly with **the CERQ score for self-blame emotion regulation strategy** ($\rho = .478$, $p < .000$, $N = 74$) and tended to correlate negatively with the CERQ score for emotion regulation strategy of positive refocusing ($\rho = -.211$, $p = .073$, $N = 74$).

- The answer for *QERG* item 30 (“First I aim and undertake something to change the way in which I express my affective feelings so that it is in agreement with the image I have about myself.”) correlated positively significantly with **the CERQ score for the emotion regulation strategy of refocus on planning** ($\rho = .322$, $p = .005$, $N = 73$), with the *CERQ* score for the emotion regulation strategy of putting into perspective ($\rho = .293$, $p = .012$, $N = 72$), and tended to correlate positively with the CERQ score for the other-blame emotion regulation strategy ($\rho = .200$, $p = .09$, $N = 73$), with the CERQ score for the emotion regulation strategy of rumination ($\rho = .209$, $p = .079$, $N = 72$), and with the CERQ score for the emotion regulation strategy of positive reappraisal ($\rho = .223$, $p = .06$, $N = 72$);

- The answer for *QERG* item 33 (“First I aim and undertake something to change the way in which I express my affective feelings so that the goals that I set for myself to be unimpeded by their expression.”) correlated positively significantly with the *CERQ* score for the emotion regulation strategy of positive reappraisal ($\rho = .292$, $p = .013$, $N = 71$), and tended to correlate positively with the CERQ score for the emotion regulation strategy of refocus on planning ($\rho = .210$, $p = .074$, $N = 73$), and with the CERQ score for the emotion regulation strategy of putting into perspective ($\rho = .199$, $p = .095$, $N = 72$).

It would have been useful a separate correlational analysis for each gender (assuming that there could be gender differences in what respects the regulation of some affective feelings or of their expression), but, because the number of male participants was small for most of the combined variables (smaller than 10), that analysis was not feasible. There was planned also an analysis of the investigated associations by taking into consideration the answers to those *QERG* items regarding the respondents’ level of satisfaction with their affective feelings and of

success in their regulation, but that analysis was not possible with the non-parametric methods required by the non-normal distribution of many of the investigated variables.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

The internal consistency of the CERQ scales was, with three exceptions (acceptance, rumination and other-blame scales, for which was rather poor), relatively good, comparable with the one obtained by Garnefski et al. (2002), although somewhat lower. For the same Romanian version of CERQ, in another research, on 43 first year students at the University of Fine Arts and Design from Cluj-Napoca, the internal consistency for the three scales was higher than the one obtained in this research (for the acceptance scale, Cronbach's α was .59, for the rumination scale: .68, and for the other-blame scale was .76). It may be that, in the present sample, some participants interpreted in a particular way some of the items of the three scales. For the SWRNE scales, the internal consistency was also comparable with the one obtained by Kim et al. (2002): for the external and introjected regulation scales was somewhat lower, for the identified regulation somewhat higher than the one mentioned in the cited study. For the autonomous and controlled regulation the internal consistency was very close to the one obtained by Kim et al. (2002). The only notable exception was the internal consistency for the integrated regulation scale that was a lot lower than the one reported by Kim et al. (2002).

The results suggest that, in general, the answer for the QERG items referring to an instrumental goal in the regulation of the expression of the negative affective feelings (items 27, 30, 32, 33), i.e. when regulation of a negative emotion expression is made in order to adjust it to the external context, to maintain the personal self-image, or in order to attain other personal goals, was positively associated with the scores for the SWRNE scales that assess the autonomous motivations for the regulation in the expression of the negative emotions, as it was to be expected. Furthermore, the answer for the item 29 of QERG that regards a heteronomous goal (aiming the conformation to social norms) for the expression regulation in the case of the negative emotions was associated positively significantly with the scores of the SWRNE scales that assess the external control in the regulation of the expression of the negative emotions, as it was, also, to be expected. The answer for the other two QERG items expressing also heteronomous goals for the expression regulation in the case of the negative emotions was not correlated positively significantly with the SWRNE scales for external regulation because their content was not as directly linked with the content of the items of those scales as the content of the QERG item 29. The preference for the free, unregulated, expression of the negative emotions (indicated by the answer for the QERG item 35) was associated negatively significantly with the scores for

SWRNE scales indicating an external control of the expression regulation for the negative emotions, a results that is, also, understandable. All these results indicate that, at least, the majority of the QERG items that assess the preference for different possible goals in the expression regulation of the negative emotions have some support for their validity.

The preference for instrumental goals of an autonomous kind in what respects the **expression** regulation of the negative emotions, assessed both with QERG and SWRNE were positively associated with the preference for the cognitive regulation strategies for the negative emotions of positive refocusing and of refocus on planning, at a statistically significant level, and only as a tendency, for the case of QERG item for the goal regarding the maintenance of a personal self-image, with the preference for the rumination and self-blame strategies. In the case of the SWRNE scales of the type mentioned above (referring to instrumental autonomous goals), they were associated positively significantly also with the emotion regulation strategy of acceptance. Only the preference for the goals of the **expression** regulation for the negative emotions that indicate the submission to an external social control, i.e. heteronomous goals, assessed mainly with SWRNE (they were in a lesser extent investigated explicitly with QERG) was associated positively with the cognitive regulation strategies for negative emotions through catastrophizing, self-blame, putting into perspective and positive refocusing. It is to be noted that the self-blame emotion regulation strategy was associated positively both with autonomous and heteronomous goals of the expression regulation of negative emotions, a result that could be explained by taking into account that the preference for this type of emotion regulation strategy correlated positively significantly also with the QERG item 26 (“First I aim and undertake something to change the way I express my affective feelings so that they are less visible.”), result that could indicate that those persons who prefer to blame themselves when they try to regulate their negative emotions also aim to express them as little as possible, no matter if at the bottom of the withholding of the expression for the negative emotion is an autonomous instrumental goal or a heteronomous one.

In what respects the relationship between the goals of the regulation of negative emotions assessed with QERG and the cognitive strategies for the regulation of negative emotions assessed with CERQ, the obtained associations indicate, as one of their possible interpretations, that the goals of the emotion regulation might play a role in choosing or in the preference for certain cognitive emotion regulation strategies. In this research, the preference for a firmly set goal aiming the complete elimination of an existing negative affective feeling (QERG item 13) was associated positively powerfully only with the preference for three of the nine investigated cognitive strategies regarding the regulation of the negative emotions, i.e. the ones that are generally considered to be the most adaptive, enhancing the psychological adjustment: refocus on planning, positive reappraisal, and putting into perspective. The preference for the goals aiming the complete

prevention of the occurrence of a negative affective feeling (QERG item 10), as well as aiming only the decrement of the intensity (QERG item 11), duration (QERG item 12) of an existing negative emotion or the change of its valence (QERG item 14) was associated positively powerfully with the preference for the cognitive emotion regulation strategy of refocus on planning, and the preference for the first three types of the mentioned goals (corresponding to the QERG items 10, 11, and 12) was associated positively also, as a slight tendency in two of the cases (QERG items 11 and 12), with the preference for a rather maladaptive cognitive emotion regulation strategy: self-blame. Of the goals targeting specifically a change in what respects the existence or the qualities of a negative emotion, mentioned above (i.e., QERG items 10, 13, 11, 12, and 14), the preference for the adaptive cognitive emotion regulation strategy of positive reappraisal was positively associated especially with the preference for the goals aiming the complete elimination of an existing or future negative emotion (QERG items 10, and 13, respectively). They are items referring rather to long-term goals, of the kind Sheppes et al. (2014) showed that are associated with the reappraisal strategy both for high and low negative emotional stimuli. As a tendency only, the preference for the goal aiming to change the valence of an existing negative emotional reaction (QERG item 14) was particularly associated positively with the preference for the adaptive cognitive emotion regulation strategy of putting into perspective.

The preference for the goals aiming the adjustment of the emotion to the expectations of some significant persons (QERG item 17), to the emotions that might occur in a similar context from the majority of the persons from one's reference group (QERG item 18), or to the respondent's impression about her/his image in her/his reference group (QERG item 20), i.e. rather heteronomous goals, was associated positively powerfully with the generally maladaptive cognitive emotion regulation strategy of catastrophizing. It is a result that suggests that the one's fear of losing or damaging her/his social image could be a catalyst in choosing such maladaptive emotion regulation strategy, considered to be generally a risk for one's psychological health. Furthermore, the preference for a set goal aiming the adjustment of one's emotions to the expectations of a significant person (QERG item 17) could discourage, as a slight tendency, the choice of some more desirable cognitive emotion regulation strategies as positive reappraisal and putting into perspective. The preference for another heteronomous emotion regulation goal, aiming to adjust one's own emotion to the others' image in what respects her/his own person (QERG item 20), also could discourage the choice of the more adaptive cognitive emotion regulation strategy of positive refocusing. The goals discussed above (QERG items 17, 18, and 20) could be categorized also as demonstrative goals, which, in accordance with the Rusk, Tamir and Rothbaum's (2011) research, tend to be associated with less adaptive and desirable emotion regulation strategies as the ones of rumination or suppression.

The preference for instrumental goals, which are rather autonomous goals, aiming to adjust one's own emotions to the external context (QERG item 16), to one's personal image (QERG item 19) or to the attainment of another personal goal (QERG item 22), was associated positively powerfully with the self-blame cognitive emotion regulation strategy, an association that might be explained through an internal locus of control as an attributional style. The preference for the first of the above-mentioned goals (QERG item 16) had a significant positive association also with the preference for the cognitive emotion regulation strategy of refocus on planning, which also could mean that one takes responsibility for changing a situation after the identification of an internal cause of her/his negative emotion, with the preference for the cognitive emotion regulation strategy through rumination, maybe as a consequence of the failure in finding a way to change the current situation, as well as with the preference for the cognitive emotion regulation strategy of putting into perspective, which might be useful, presumably, for an adequate evaluation of the context to which the emotion is adjusted. Of the instrumental emotion regulation goals, only the preference for the one aiming the change of the negative emotions in order not to impede the attainment of another personal goal (QERG item 22) was associated positively significantly with the preference for the cognitive emotion regulation strategy of positive reappraisal. The preference for the same goal, as well as the preference for the goal aiming the adjustment to the external context (QERG item 16) were associated positively also with the preference for the cognitive emotion regulation strategy of putting into perspective.

The preference for a goal of a cognitive type, aiming the understanding of one's own negative affective feelings (QERG item 23), was associated positively powerfully both with the preference for the cognitive emotion regulation strategy through rumination and the one for the cognitive emotion regulation strategy of positive reappraisal and significantly negatively with the preference for the cognitive emotion regulation strategy of other-blame. It is a result that suggests that this kind of goal might prevent the occurrence of the negative consequences of the maladaptive other-blame strategy. The preference for the same goal was associated positively also, but only as a tendency, with the preference for the cognitive emotion regulation strategies of self-blame and refocus on planning, which are presumably strategies requiring also a rather raised level of cognitive reflection, of the kind generated also by this type of goal. The preference for another goal of a cognitive type, the one aiming to change the perspective on the valence of an emotion by understanding its relative status, and, thus, canceling it (QERG item 24), was associated positively significantly with the preference for the cognitive emotion regulation strategies through rumination and of putting into perspective, and only as a tendency with the preference for the cognitive emotion regulation strategies of refocus on planning and of positive reappraisal. It is to be noted that the preference for the two types of cognitive goals was associated with the preference

for emotion regulation strategies having a higher level of cognitive sophistication, a result that suggests that the cognitive emotion regulation goals and the emotion regulation strategies requiring higher levels of cognitive resources might potentiate each other. The emotion regulation goals of a cognitive type discussed above could be interpreted to be learning goals. In this respect, the results obtained in the present research are in accordance with the ones obtained by Rusk, Tamir and Rothbaum (2011), who also found a positive association between the preference for learning goals of emotion regulation and the preference for the adaptive cognitive emotion regulation strategy of positive reappraisal. In the same sense, it could be said also that those persons who perceive themselves as more competent in using more efficient emotion regulation strategies, requiring higher and more complex information processing resources may prefer to choose more ambitious emotion regulation goals (as those corresponding to the QERG items 10 and 13).

Finally, the lack of a goal in what respects an active emotion regulation, i.e. the preference for a passive attitude or for a spontaneous, free, experience of one's own emotions (QERG item 25) was associated negatively powerfully with the preference for the cognitive emotion regulation strategy of putting into perspective. It is a result that suggests that the reason for the absence of an active regulatory goal for one's own emotions might be an attitude of narrow and exclusive focusing on the current concrete situation, which is not necessarily accompanied by the acceptance of the negative emotions generated by that situation.

Synthetically speaking, it could be said that the preference for the cognitive emotion regulation strategies considered in the scientific literature to be adaptive and desirable (as positive reappraisal, refocus on planning, putting into perspective are) was associated only with the preference for some of the investigated emotion regulation goals: mainly the goals aiming the complete elimination of an undesirable emotion, of helping the attainment of another personal goal, or aiming the understanding of one's personal affective feelings. Therefore, it might be that, in order to promote the choice of the desirable, adaptive, cognitive emotion regulation strategies, it would be useful to identify one's emotion regulation goals, in the first place, and then change those goals, in case they are not compatible, as indicated by the associations found in this research, with the promoted strategies. The obtained results indicate, also, that some cognitive emotion regulation strategies considered generally as maladaptive or undesirable, as rumination or self-blame are considered, could have some positive valences, depending on the emotion regulation goal served by them.

In what regards the relationship between the preferred goals of the regulation of the way the negative affective feelings are expressed and the preferred cognitive emotion regulation strategies, although their link is less direct and obvious, because the investigated strategies are mainly for the regulation of the experience of the negative emotions, some statistically significant associations were still obtained, especially in the case of the goals of the expression regulation assessed with

SWRNE. It may be that the associations occurred predominantly for the goals assessed with SWRNE because, in SWRNE, the goals are expressed differently than in QERG: they are formulated as reasons for not expressing negative emotions, whereas, in QERG, the goals are formulated as targets for changing the expression of the negative emotions. In the regulation of the way the negative emotion are expressed, the preference for the cognitive emotion regulation strategy of catastrophizing was associated, too, as in the case of the goals for the regulation of the way negative emotion are experienced, with the preference for the heteronomous SWRNE goals (particularly with the introjected regulation). The preference for autonomous goals, assessed with SWRNE, for the regulation of the way negative emotion are expressed was also associated positively with the preference for cognitive emotion regulation strategies considered to be generally adaptive ones: acceptance, refocus on planning, and positive reappraisal. In this case, the preference for the adaptive strategy of putting into perspective was not associated with autonomous regulatory goals for the way negative emotion are expressed, but rather with heteronomous, demonstrative ones. The same type of association (with heteronomous goals) occurred also for another rather adaptive cognitive emotion regulation strategy: positive refocusing. The preference for autonomous regulatory goals of the way negative emotion are expressed was positively associated instead with the preference for two cognitive emotion regulation strategies that are considered generally to be rather maladaptive: rumination and self-blame, a result similar with the one obtained for the regulatory goals of the way negative emotions are experienced. The preference for the cognitive emotion regulation strategy of self-blame was associated positively also with the preference for heteronomous regulatory goals of the way negative emotions are expressed, suggesting a bivalent (adaptive and maladaptive) character of this emotion regulation strategy. Of the regulatory goals of the expression of negative emotions assessed with QERG, the preference for two autonomous instrumental goals (the one in which the expression regulation aims to prevent the failure in the attainment of another personal goal, and the one in which the expression regulation aims the maintenance of one's own image) was also positively associated (significantly or as a tendency) with the preference for the adaptive cognitive emotion regulation strategies of positive reappraisal, of refocus on planning and putting into perspective. In the case of the preference for the expression regulation goal assessed with QERG that aims the maintenance of one's own image, there occurred also a tendency of a positive association with the preference for two rather maladaptive cognitive emotion strategies: other-blame and rumination. Peculiar associations occurred for the goal assessed with QERG through which the expression of the negative emotion is down-regulated, making it less visible: a powerful positive one with the preference for the cognitive emotion regulation strategy of self-blame, and a negative one (as a tendency) with the preference for the rather adaptive cognitive emotion regulation strategy of positive

refocusing. It may be that people prone to assume responsibility for their feelings and acts are more self-conscious, and that is why they can be more easily embarrassed by the expression of their negative feelings, trying to make it less salient. Generally, it could be noted that the results regarding the associations between the preference for the cognitive emotion regulation strategies and the preference for the expression regulatory goals of the negative emotions follow a similar pattern with the one obtained for the associations between the preference for the cognitive emotion regulation strategies and the regulatory goals for the experience of the negative emotions. It is a result that may be explained by the possible link between the choice of regulatory goals for the expression and, respectively, experience of the negative emotions, and by the similar resources needed in their implementations.

Given the exploratory character of the present research, it would be desirable that new research to be made in the future in order to see which of the results obtained here are accidental and which can be replicated, using also new instruments, including other emotion regulation goals and strategies, with samples of participants with different demographic characteristics, and maybe experimental designs, in order to identify the causal links between the associated variables.

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ANNEX 1

QERG - English version
Questionnaire for affective feelings

In order to answer to the questionnaire from below you are required to use one of the two following scales:

Scale 1

Not at all	Very little	A little	Neither much nor little (in a moderate degree)	A lot	Very much	Extremely much
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Scale 2

Strong disagreement	Moderate disagreement	Slight disagreement	Neutral	Slight agreement	Moderate agreement	Strong agreement
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Please, read the statements from below and indicate, for the numbered ones, how much you agree or disagree with each of them using the **Scale 1** or the **Scale 2**, as it is indicated in each case. Note in the answer sheet the number from the indicated scale, corresponding to the answer which is the most suitable in your case, next to the number of that statement from the **Table 1**. For those statements in which it is indicated on the answer sheet the following requirement, please, give a separate answer for each of the two situations mentioned on the answer sheet: *positive affective feelings* and, respectively, *negative affective feelings*.

Thank you very much!

When you have affective feelings (emotions, sentiments), they may be different than the way you want them to be. I appreciate that, in general, (use **Scale 1**, indicating the magnitude of the difference in each of the following cases, or how big or how small it is):

1. The intensity of my affective feelings is greater than I would want it to be.
2. The intensity of my affective feelings is lower than I would want it to be.
3. The frequency of my undesirable affective feelings is greater than I would want it to be.
4. The frequency of my undesirable affective feelings is lower than I would want it to be.
5. The duration of my affective feelings is greater than I would want it to be.
6. The duration of my affective feelings is lower than I would want it to be.
7. I express my affective feelings more than I would want it.

8. I express my affective feelings less than I would want it.
9. I express my affective feelings in a different way than I would want it.

When you have affective feelings (emotions, sentiments) that are different than the ones desired by you, no matter if they are positive or negative ones, you can try to change them, the one or the other, in a greater or smaller degree, in various ways, because of different reasons. If I have affective feelings that are different than the way I want them to be, in general (use Scale 2, indicating the degree in which you agree with each of the following statements):

10. First I aim and undertake something to completely prevent (impede) the occurrence of the unwanted affective feelings.
11. First I aim and undertake something to decrease the intensity of the unwanted affective feelings.
12. First I aim and undertake something to decrease the duration of the unwanted affective feelings.
13. First I aim and undertake something to completely eliminate the occurred unwanted affective feelings.
14. First I aim and undertake something to change the negative affective feelings into positive ones.
15. First I aim and undertake something to change the positive affective feelings into feelings that are more suited to the situation in which I find myself.
16. First I aim and undertake something to change my affective feelings so that to be more suited with what I think that it should be suited to the context in which I find myself.
17. First I aim and undertake something to change my affective feelings so that to be in accord with what other persons important to me would want me to feel.
18. First I aim and undertake something to change my affective feelings so that to be in accord with what I believe that most of those around me feel or would feel in a similar context.
19. First I aim and undertake something to change my affective feelings so that to be in accord with the image I have about myself.
20. First I aim and undertake something to change my affective feelings so that to be in accord with the image that I believe others have it about me.
21. First I aim and undertake something to change my affective feelings so that to help me achieve the goals that I set for myself.
22. First I aim and undertake something to change my affective feelings so that the goals that I set for myself to be unimpeded by them.
23. First I aim and undertake something to understand my affective feelings.
24. First I aim to avoid dividing the affective feelings in wanted and unwanted ones.
25. I let my affective feelings the way they are, without trying to change them in any way, waiting for them to change by themselves.

When you express your affective feelings (emotions, sentiments) different than the way you want it, you can try to change their expression in a greater or smaller degree, in various ways, because of different reasons. If I express my affective feelings different than the way I want it, in general (use Scale 2, indicating the degree in which you agree with each of the following statements):

26. First I aim and undertake something to change the way in which I express my affective feelings so that they are less visible.
27. First I aim and undertake something to change the way I express my affective feelings so that it is in agreement with what I think that it would be suitable in the context in which I find myself.
28. First I aim and undertake something to change the way in which I express my affective feelings so that it is in accord with the way other persons important to me would want me to express them.
29. First I aim and undertake something to change the way in which I express my affective feelings so that it is in agreement with the way I believe that most of those around me express or would express them in a similar context.
30. First I aim and undertake something to change the way in which I express my affective feelings so that it is in agreement with the image I have about myself.
31. First I aim and undertake something to change the way in which I express my affective feelings so that it is in accord with the image that I believe others have it about me.
32. First I aim and undertake something to change the way in which I express my affective feelings so that it would help me to achieve the goals that I set for myself.
33. First I aim and undertake something to change the way in which I express my affective feelings so that the goals that I set for myself to be unimpeded by their expression.
34. First I aim and undertake something to change the way in which I express my affective feelings so that their expression not to be disturbing in any way for those around me.
35. I let the expression of my affective feelings to be a spontaneous one, without trying to change it in any way.

I appreciate, in general, that (use the **Scale 2**, indicating the degree in which you agree with each of the following statements):

36. I manage to control my affective feelings so that they are in the way I want them to be.
37. I manage to control the expression of my affective feelings so that it is in the way I want it to be.
38. People can control their affective feelings.

Pseudonym _____
Gender _____
Age _____

Answer sheet

Item		1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1	positive feelings							
	negative feelings							
2	positive feelings							
	negative feelings							
3	positive feelings							
	negative feelings							
4	positive feelings							
	negative feelings							
5	positive feelings							
	negative feelings							
6	positive feelings							
	negative feelings							
7	positive feelings							
	negative feelings							
8	positive feelings							
	negative feelings							
9	positive feelings							
	negative feelings							
10	positive feelings							
	negative feelings							
11	positive feelings							
	negative feelings							
12	positive feelings							
	negative feelings							
13	positive feelings							
	negative feelings							
14								
15								
16	positive feelings							
	negative feelings							
17	positive feelings							
	negative feelings							
18	positive feelings							
	negative feelings							
19	positive feelings							
	negative feelings							
20	positive feelings							
	negative feelings							
21	positive feelings							
	negative feelings							

22	positive feelings							
	negative feelings							
23	positive feelings							
	negative feelings							
24								
25	positive feelings							
	negative feelings							
26	positive feelings							
	negative feelings							
27	positive feelings							
	negative feelings							
28	positive feelings							
	negative feelings							
29	positive feelings							
	negative feelings							
30	positive feelings							
	negative feelings							
31	positive feelings							
	negative feelings							
32	positive feelings							
	negative feelings							
33	positive feelings							
	negative feelings							
34	positive feelings							
	negative feelings							
35	positive feelings							
	negative feelings							
36	positive feelings							
	negative feelings							
37	positive feelings							
	negative feelings							
38	positive feelings							
	negative feelings							

QERG- Romanian version
Chestionar privind trăirile afective

Pentru a răspunde la chestionarul de mai jos va trebui să folosiți una dintre următoarele scale:

Scala 1

Deloc	Foarte puțin	Puțin	Nici mult, nici puțin (potrivit)	Mult	Foarte mult	Extrem de mult
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Scala 2

Dezacord moderat	Dezacord ușor	Neutru	Acord ușor	Acord moderat	Acord puternic
2	3	4	5	6	7

Vă rugăm să citiți enunțurile de mai jos și să indicați, pentru cele numerotate, cât de mult sunteți de acord sau în dezacord cu fiecare dintre ele, folosind **Scala 1** sau **Scala 2**, după cum este indicat în fiecare caz. Notați pe foia de răspuns numărul corespunzător răspunsului din scala indicată care se potrivește cel mai mult în cazul dvs. în dreptul numărului enunțului respectiv din **tabelul 1** de pe foaia de răspuns. Vă rugăm ca, pentru acele enunțuri în care se indică în foaia de răspuns acest lucru, să dați un răspuns separat pentru fiecare dintre cele două situații menționate în foaia de răspuns: trăiri afective pozitive și, respectiv, negative.

Va mulțumim!

Când aveți trăiri afective (emoții, sentimente), ele pot fi altfel decât ați dori să fie. Apreciez că, în general, (folosiți Scala 1, indicând cât de mare este diferența în fiecare din cazurile de mai jos sau cu cât e mai mare sau mai mică):

1. Intensitatea trăirilor mele afective este mai mare decât cea care aș vrea să fie.
2. Intensitatea trăirilor mele afective este mai mică decât cea care aș vrea să fie.
3. Frecvența trăirilor mele afective nedorite este mai mare decât cea care aș vrea să fie.
4. Frecvența trăirilor mele afective nedorite este mai mică decât cea care aș vrea să fie.
5. Durata trăirilor mele afective este mai mare decât cea care aș vrea să fie.
6. Durata trăirilor mele afective este mai mică decât cea care aș vrea să fie.
7. Îmi exprim trăirile mele afective mai mult decât mi-aș dori.
8. Îmi exprim trăirile mele afective mai puțin decât mi-aș dori.
9. Îmi exprim trăirile afective într-un mod diferit de cel pe care mi l-aș dori.

Când aveți trăiri afective (emoții, sentimente) care sunt altfel decât cele pe care le-ați dori, fie că sunt pozitive sau negative, puteți încerca să le schimbați pe unele sau pe altele, mai mult sau mai puțin, în diverse modalități și din diverse motive. Dacă am

trăiri afective care sunt altfel decât cum le doresc, în general (folosiți **Scala 2**, indicând cât de mult sunteți de acord cu fiecare dintre enunțurile de mai jos):

10. Mai întâi îmi propun și întreprind ceva să previn (să împiedic) cu totul apariția trăirilor afective nedorite.
11. Mai întâi îmi propun și întreprind ceva ca să scad intensitatea trăirilor afective nedorite.
12. Mai întâi îmi propun și întreprind ceva ca să scad durata trăirilor afective nedorite.
13. Mai întâi îmi propun și întreprind ceva ca să elimin complet trăirile afective nedorite care au apărut.
14. Mai întâi îmi propun și întreprind ceva ca să schimb trăirile afective negative în trăiri afective pozitive.
15. Mai întâi îmi propun și întreprind ceva ca să schimb trăirile afective pozitive în trăiri afective mai potrivite cu situația în care mă aflu.
16. Mai întâi îmi propun și întreprind ceva ca să schimb trăirile mele afective astfel încât să se potrivească cu ceea ce mă gândesc eu că s-ar potrivi contextului în care mă aflu.
17. Mai întâi îmi propun și întreprind ceva ca să schimb trăirile mele afective în așa fel încât să fie în acord cu ce și-ar dori alte persoane importante pentru mine să simt.
18. Mai întâi îmi propun și întreprind ceva ca să schimb trăirile mele afective în așa fel încât să vină în acord cu ce cred că simt sau ar simți cei mai mulți dintre cei din jurul meu într-un context similar.
19. Mai întâi îmi propun și întreprind ceva ca să schimb trăirile mele afective în așa fel încât să fie în acord cu imaginea pe care o am despre mine.
20. Mai întâi îmi propun și întreprind ceva ca să schimb trăirile mele afective în așa fel încât să fie în acord cu imaginea pe care cred eu că o au alții despre mine.
21. Mai întâi îmi propun și întreprind ceva ca să schimb trăirile mele afective în așa fel încât să nu fie împiedicate să mă ajute să îmi realizez scopurile pe care mi le propun.
22. Mai întâi îmi propun și întreprind ceva ca să schimb trăirile mele afective în așa fel încât scopurile pe care mi le propun să fie neîmpiedicate de ele.
23. Mai întâi îmi propun și întreprind ceva ca să-mi înțeleg trăirile afective.
24. Mai întâi îmi propun să evit să împart trăirile în dorite și nedorite.
25. Las trăirile așa cum sunt, fără să încerc să le schimb în vreun fel, așteptând să se schimbe de la sine.

Când vă exprimați trăirile afective (emoții, sentimente) altfel decât v-ați dori, puteți încerca să le schimbați, mai mult sau mai puțin, exprimarea lor în diverse modalități și din diverse motive. Dacă îmi exprim trăirile afective altfel decât cum îmi doresc, în general (folosiți **Scala 2**, indicând cât de mult sunteți de acord cu fiecare dintre enunțurile de mai jos):

26. Mai întâi îmi propun și întreprind ceva ca să schimb modul în care îmi exprim trăirile mele afective în așa fel încât ele să fie mai puțin vizibile.
27. Mai întâi îmi propun și întreprind ceva să schimb modul în care îmi exprim trăirile mele afective în așa fel încât să se potrivească cu ce mă gândesc eu că s-ar potrivi contextului în care mă aflu.
28. Mai întâi îmi propun și întreprind ceva ca să schimb modul în care îmi exprim trăirile afective în așa fel încât să fie în acord cu modul în care și-ar dori alte persoane importante pentru mine să le exprim.

29. Mai întâi îmi propun și întreprind ceva ca să schimb modul în care îmi exprim trăirile mele afective în așa fel încât să fie în acord cu modul în care cred că le exprimă sau le-ar exprima cei mai mulți dintre cei din jurul meu într-un context similar.
30. Mai întâi îmi propun și întreprind ceva ca să schimb modul în care îmi exprim trăirile afective în așa fel încât să fie în acord cu imaginea pe care o am eu despre mine.
31. Mai întâi îmi propun și întreprind ceva ca să schimb modul în care exprim trăirile afective în așa fel încât să fie în acord cu imaginea pe care cred că o au alții despre mine.
32. Mai întâi îmi propun și întreprind ceva ca să schimb modul în care exprim trăirile mele afective în așa fel încât să mă ajute să îmi realizez scopurile pe care mi le propun.
33. Mai întâi îmi propun și întreprind ceva ca să schimb modul în care îmi exprim trăirile afective în așa fel încât scopurile pe care mi le propun să fie neîmpiedicate de exprimarea lor.
34. Mai întâi îmi propun și întreprind ceva ca să schimb modul în care exprim trăirile mele afective în așa fel încât exprimarea lor să fie nederanjată (incompatibilă, incomodă) în vreun fel pentru cei din jur.
35. Las expresia trăirilor mele afective să fie una spontană, fără să încerc să o schimb în vreun fel.

Apreciez că, în general (folosiți **Scala 2**, indicând cât de mult sunteți de acord cu fiecare din enunțurile de mai jos):

36. Reușesc să îmi controlez trăirile afective astfel încât ele să fie așa cum mi-aș dori.
37. Reușesc să-mi controlez expresia trăirilor mele afective astfel încât ea să fie precum mi-aș dori.
38. Oamenii pot să-și controleze trăirile afective.

SWRNE - Romanian Version

Vă rugăm să citiți enunțurile de mai jos și să indicați, pentru cele numerotate, cât de mult sunteți de acord sau în dezacord cu fiecare dintre ele, notând cu un x căsuța de pe foia de răspuns aflată în dreptul coloanei răspunsului care se potrivește cel mai mult în cazul dvs. și în dreptul numărului enunțului respectiv.

Vă mulțumim!

Când *nu* exprimați în fața altor persoane trăirile voastre afective negative (emoții sau sentimente negative) o puteți face din *diverse motive*. Motivul pentru care nu îmi exprim în fața altor persoane trăirile afective negative este acela că:

1. Mă gândesc că alții s-ar putea supăra pe mine dacă exprim aceste trăiri.
2. M-aș simți vinovat(ă) dacă îmi las trăirile negative să iasă la iveală.
3. Simt o satisfacție personală atunci când pot să îmi trăiesc emoțiile fără să las ca ele să fie supărătoare.
4. Exprimarea emoțiilor negative doar i-ar răni pe alții și o persoană nu ar trebui să facă acest lucru.

5. Există unele situații în care este util să îmi exprim trăirile și altele în care nu este util să fac acest lucru.
6. Aș simți că sunt ca o persoană rea dacă mi-aș exprima în fața prietenilor mei trăirile negative.
7. Părinții și prietenii mei se așteaptă să mă controlez.
8. Îmi face plăcere să fiu conștient(ă) de trăirile mele, dar îmi aduce satisfacție și păstrarea unei aparențe pozitive în exterior.
9. Este important pentru mine personal să nu îi rănesc pe alții.
10. Nu cred că am dreptul să deranjez alți oameni cu trăirile mele negative.
11. Ca o persoană grijulie, nu vreau să-i supăr pe alții cu trăirile mele negative.
12. Îmi e teamă că oamenii nu mă vor plăcea dacă îmi exprim trăirile.
13. Este important să fiu conștient(ă) de trăirile mele negative, dar dacă le păstrez pentru mine însumi(însămi) este pentru a-mi păstra stabilitatea emoțională.

Există *diverse motive* pentru care uneori vă puteți purta ca și cum totul ar fi în ordine, chiar dacă sunteți supărat. Uneori, când sunt supărat, mă port ca și cum totul este în regulă, pentru că:

14. Mi-ar fi rușine cu mine însumi(însămi) dacă aș lăsa ca trăirile mele negative să iasă la iveală.
15. Important este să-mi înțeleg propria supărare, dar s-ar putea să nu fie util să le-o împărtășesc altora.
16. Mă gândesc că mi-ar putea distruge relațiile mele cu alte persoane dacă vorbesc mereu despre ce mă deranjează.
17. Este important pentru mine să nu îi împovărez pe alții cu problemele mele.
18. Îmi aduce satisfacție să fiu capabil(ă) să fac astfel încât supărarea mea să nu interfereze cu scopurile mele, împiedicându-le realizarea.
19. Vreau ca alții să creadă că sunt matur(ă).
20. Este o provocare interesantă să rămân calm(ă) și a nu ajunge să fiu supărat(ă) mereu.
21. M-aș simți rușinat(ă) dacă i-aș lăsa pe alții să vadă ce mă deranjează.
22. Simt că este un semn de maturitate să păstrez o atitudine pozitivă.
23. Îmi aduce satisfacție să fiu capabil(ă) să-mi ating scopurile mele chiar și atunci când sunt supărat(ă).
24. Cred că oamenii ar trebui să-și păstreze supărarea numai pentru ei înșiși.
25. Mi-e teamă că oamenii nu mă vor plăcea, dacă voi lăsa să se vadă ce mă deranjează.
26. Îmi păstrez trăirile negative numai pentru mine astfel încât să pot realiza proiecte importante.
27. Cred că ar trebui să urmez normele sociale.
28. Vreau ca alții să creadă că sunt o persoană bună.