



ISSN 1584-4404

# Yearbook of the George Barițiu History Institute of Cluj-Napoca Series *Humanistica*



humanistica.ro

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### **How to cite this article:**

Isac, Ionuț-Constantin (2023) *Metaphysics in a Nutshell – A Romanian View*, Yearbook of the George Barițiu History Institute of Cluj-Napoca, Series Humanistica, Vol. 21, pp. 163–173. DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.8367360



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## OPINION & DEBATE

### METAPHYSICS IN A NUTSHELL – A ROMANIAN VIEW

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**Abstract:** *METAPHYSICS IN A NUTSHELL – A ROMANIAN VIEW.* The early philosophical works written by Professor Dumitru Isac were focused mainly on the so-called „critical spirit”. By this syntagm, Prof. Isac meant to express philosophically what would be essential in Kant’s criticism, once featured in the famous *Critiques of the magister in Königsberg* and subsequently detailed by his philosophical posterity. But being essentially an inquiry and a search for the truth, for the value as well as for the certainty of knowledge, the range of critical spirit is much wider than Kant’s metaphysics itself. The modern beginning of the spirit of criticism could be located in Descartes’ masterwork *Discourse de la méthode*. Since then, it had a huge impact on the philosophical methodology, imposing a specific style of thinking on every established philosopher. Therefore, Dumitru Isac considered that such a conceptual framework allows a specific philosophical reading: instead of a linear approach of individual metaphysical innovations, seen as a big plain “line” of individual systems of thinking, being historically isolated from one another, it would rather be useful to analyse and evaluate all of them as “steps” of coherent development in the spirit of criticism. Therefore, through his early writings, whose climax remains the book *Cunoaștere și Transcendență [Knowledge and Transcendence]* (1943), D. Isac sketches an original metaphysical draft, from the standpoint of a holistic “conciliation” and “mix” of the two major trends recognizable over the entire history of philosophy: metaphysical/ ontological realism and epistemological idealism/ transcendentalism.

**Keywords** Dumitru Isac, Metaphysics, Criticism, Critical Spirit, Transcendentalism, Realism, Synthesis.

The distinguished professor, researcher and writer Dumitru Isac (1914-1984) found early in himself a vivid interest for systematic metaphysics, which began with an inquiry on the so-called “critical spirit”. Both his *Journal of ideas* (1933-1952/ 2003) and *Knowledge and Transcendence* (1943/ 2003) contain accurate explanations of his motivation concerning the research of the *critical spirit* in the history of philosophy. Later, D. Isac decided to extend his inquiries, initially accomplished on Descartes, Kant and Lucian Blaga, to the whole of the socio-cultural *milieu*. Thus, he began a new philosophical investigation, suitable to

contemporaneity. Eventually, he reached the landmarks of an original metaphysics (a kind of “*critical realism*”), for whose development the Romanian historical and political circumstances after 1945 unfortunately did not represent any propitious background.

Even since a sophomore, he endeavoured to explore the germs of the “critical spirit”, which he conceived of as a liberation from the various dogmas and tics of everyday mentality. He subtly noticed that, if there had been done a lot of writing about intelligence, in exchange, about folly or stupidity there were very few works written (this being especially valid in his day, as he thought). To set somebody free from the seductive and almighty guardianship of the folly – not only concerning the often accused “ignorance”, but also its social consequences – one must be prepared to perform a thorough examination of the intellect. The very old *stultitia* has always proved itself difficult even for the brightest minds – as it appears obvious in the whole civilized history of mankind. Beyond the mind’s narrowness, folly associates itself to evilness and bad intentions. Thinking of Erasmus’ *Praise of Folly*, D. Isac planned to write a book about this calamity of humankind; however, it remained as postponed project *sine die*. Certainly, the author of the notes in the *Journal* has clashed countless times with this social plague, in circumstances I was told about with wisely meaning and subtle humour on the sense of my childhood and adolescence.

The first very opportunity met by Dumitru Isac to express his “critical spirit” as a moral attitude consciously assumed was that of the time of opting for academic studies. To the general astonishment – including of his former schoolteachers – he chose philosophy: “When my ex – high-schoolteachers have heard that I am going in for philosophy, they found themselves very amazed and unsatisfied with. It has not been much left to them as they do not answer to my ‘hello’. Why is it so? Well, it is simple, because of the assumption that if you go in for philosophy you are, first of all, useless to yourself and then to the society. Useless to yourself because everybody expects that studies should bring an income; or, philosophy does not kill people, nor buries them or helps them escape from the prison. Philosophical principles are refused to be bought by anyone and with them you cannot build castles or bridges over waterways. As to the society, you are some kind of a being which makes mess into others’ business, living with your feet on the ground and your head in the clouds. And my teachers, having good opinions about me, did not want to see me in this position” (Isac, 1933-1952/ 2003, pp. 31-32).

The reaction of the future student Dumitru Isac to this “all-too-human” stance let others see his overwhelming belief in *philosophical idealism* (in a general manner of speaking), i.e., on metaphysics seen as *a world of abstract ideas, of meanings and absolute values*, at the opposite side of the empirical or the “common world”. If we prefer to label it, we might say that we are dealing here with a sort of “essentialism” and “metaphysical absolutism”, where common sense is forbidden. Such an attitude could be explained by the “native” idealism of youth

age, usually associated with selfishness; or even better, by the influence of the great stream of classical ontology (Parmenides and Plato, among and, maybe, above others) which the young D. Isac used to study carefully.

For this reason, D. Isac nurtured the conviction that the philosopher cannot find his/ her place in society, not just because it could be here the case of an “unfathomable genius”, but also because between the philosopher and society there is an ontological and psychological precipice. The only reasonable and acceptable outcome for the philosopher is that one of conceding to “others” (the “common people”) a circumstantial justification, without agreeing with them.

D. Isac published many studies and articles in well-known reviews of the 1930s and 1940s Romania (e.g., “Freamătul Școalei”, “Symposion”, “Revista de filosofie”, “Revista Fundațiilor Regale”, “Cronicar”, “Bucovina literară”, “Hyperion” etc.), focused on two main philosophical issues: the Kantian and post-Kantian criticism coming out of the *Critique of Pure Reason* and the philosophy of Lucian Blaga, especially the epistemology of the *Trilogy of Knowledge* and the ontology of the *Cosmological Trilogy*.

The analysis of these fields involves a very important systematic aspect: the idea of *certainty of the human knowledge* correlated to the idea of *reality of the external world*. Therefore, these co-ordinates of the philosophical research become indispensable for any future metaphysics; once considered both *historically* and *systematically*, they are supported by some important presuppositions which D. Isac detailed in his works of youth.

A first presupposition, which has to be considered as the dawn of the second reflexive stage of D. Isac, is that of the *multiplicity of philosophical kinds*. In spite of a very widespread and common opinion, it would be very hard, if not impossible, to find out “THE PHILOSOPHY” (in capitals). The history of philosophy shows us a certain number of theories, systems and reflections which can be associated under some common characteristics, such as *rationalism*, *empiricism*, *idealism*, *materialism*, *philosophy as system*, *philosophy as a “free reflection”*, *philosophy as a “final” speculation* etc. One could speak about philosophy only having in mind all these particular features which make the difference between a certain method of doing philosophy and the other or all the others.

Also, it appears obvious that philosophy can neither identify itself “one-on-one” with this multiplicity of conceptions, systems and theories; otherwise, it would mean that there are as many philosophies as philosophers or, to put it otherwise, one could no longer speak about philosophy but only about philosophers. This would be unacceptable, as it would entail an utter “crumbling” of the subject. Between these edges, D. Isac makes his option for understanding philosophy as a certain *kind* of the above-mentioned, easily enough to be considered, identified in a middle of a cultural tradition, defined through clear and recognizable features as well as analysed in its intimate framework.

Another basic presupposition of D. Isac is not to consider *à la lettre* the transcendental metaphysics of Kantian descendance (which is an inevitably doubtful approach, as proved by the very many critics brought to the master of Königsberg) but to give it an interpretation according to its *critical spirit*, that will last over. What does this mean? In the works of D. Isac, “critical spirit” means an outstanding intellectual quality of the philosopher – that one of researching on the *fundaments* of philosophy and thus evaluating over and over again the truth of one’s ideas. This is not only a problem for the philosopher as individual, but also a question of succession of the philosophers’ generations: in time, the lack of “critical spirit” could damage and compromise a whole philosophical culture. In the history of modern philosophy, the proliferation of varieties of *classical metaphysical ontology* in the absence of an epistemological critical examination of the human capacity of knowledge, has led to a lot of pointless speculations. Therefore, Hume and Kant dealt an extraordinary “blow” to this kind of metaphysics, demonstrating the futility of its attempts of knowing the *transcendent* only through the instruments of “pure reason”.

Concerning the significance of Kantian criticism, one may dispute the existence of 12 categories (more or less) and also doubt the fact that the “thing-in-itself” could be an intrinsic element of Kant’s transcendental metaphysics or disregard the argument that such analysis would entail the abandonment of all the fundamental assumptions advanced by the *Critique of Pure Reason* etc. However, what reaches beyond each and every denial is the re-definition of philosophy’s identity by discarding the delusive goal of the “absolute” knowledge of a “world-in-itself” (i.e., *the transcendence, lato sensu*), inaccessible to human experience. And this owes to the “critical spirit”, which guides philosophical research to a stronger selection of a metaphysical hypothesis on its way to *certainty* and *truth*. In this respect, D. Isac has even ventured himself to make a “prophecy”: „[...] if philosophy will ever succeed to come out of its obfuscating multiplicity of conceptions – as presented by its history – and reach a unitary and generally accepted system of sentences, this will be only possible if it allowed the «critical spirit» to hold the «headquarters»; because «critical spirit» is the only one fit to the philosophical *impetus* of all times and fully accommodated to the eternal ideal of speculation; it contains in itself the virtues of realizing the harmony of human intelligence” (Isac, 1939, pp. 109-110).

Influenced by the creed of Nicolae Bagdasar and Ion Petrovici, D. Isac seeks thoroughly the problem of critical spirit, asking himself if this is a transient moment in the history of philosophy and, if not, what is its relationship with philosophical methodology. In fact, the critical spirit proves itself to be much more than a certain method; it is a *spiritual outlook* which commands all the methods, an *irrepressible passion for certainty*, basic to all metaphysical attempts (Isac, 1939, p. 120, 121). According to Petrovici, Kant’s criticism has been a “cold shower” for philosophy, which arose critical spirit to the rank of *supreme and universal value*

of philosophy – far beyond even the huge historical importance of Kant's works. Thus, D. Isac nurtured the conviction that such an understanding of the critical spirit will contribute in the future to the reorganization and harmonization of philosophical problems; that different philosophers from various countries and cultures would be able, however, to agree on the essential features of a philosophical domain, to conjugate their efforts for obtaining solutions to problems as well as to succeed in critical demarcations of their contributions all over their common path.

Obviously, the great interest of D. Isac for the critical spirit and Kant's criticism as a whole merge with a state of mind very present in the Romanian pre-war, as well as interwar culture. Research of the history of Kant's influence in Romania proves that his metaphysics has been – mostly by the idea of systematic thinking – a true “touchstone” for several generations of intellectuals. At that time, Kant's criticism was perceived as a standard or a norm of the philosophy as system. Being educated in such an intellectual *milieu*, D. Isac has quickly recognized and assimilated Descartes' and Kant's standards of philosophical excellence (i.e., critics and clarity of thinking). Moreover, he maintained this ideal his entire life, despite the hostile historical circumstances of post-war Romania (after 1945-1946).

The peak of D. Isac's works concerning the heritage of the critical paradigm of thinking is the book *Knowledge and Transcendence* (1943). It comprises 5 chapters: *Philosophy, Knowledge of Transcendence; The Critical Spirit in the Knowledge of Transcendence; Dilemmas of Transcending; The Problem of the “Thing-in-Itself”; Knowledge and Transcendence*. There were some strong convictions to motivate the publication of the book, dedicated to Professor Ion Petrovici: the philosophy's autonomy regarding science, as well as the specifics and the meaning of the philosophical speculation; *the tendency of transcending*; the necessity to give a founded retort to the “intuitionism” and “essays” in fashion at the time in Romania, by asserting and making arguments about the role of thinking, of “lucid spirituality” and reason; substantiation of *critical realism* in order to formulate a solution to the problem of transcendence.

On the basis of Kant's criticism, D. Isac makes a founded and very thorough criticism of the “naïve” realism as well as the solipsism, demonstrating their limits in principle, as they derive from the examination of modern history of philosophy and modern history of science. Thus, he thoroughly analyses not only the fruit of Descartes' and Kant's philosophy, but also does an original valorisation of contemporary Meyerson's and Brunschvicg's conclusions, as emphasized in their works. The last two ones were philosophers of science of great authority at the time, especially on the problems of *scientific explanation*. Within the Romanian philosophy, D. Isac finds a profound affinity with Mircea Florian's *Metaphysics and its Problems*, in the respect of conceiving the *transcendence* as an object of philosophy and *explicans* of the sensible world. From that perspective, the first

traditional demand for any kind of philosophy is nothing else than *to transcend* the limits either of knowledge or of existence, or of both, in order to conquer the remote and well-hidden “Holy Grail” of the Transcendent (Florian, 1943/ 2002, p. 225).

But why would a certain philosopher assume this difficult and frustrating goal? Is it rational or rather delusive? According to Florian, it would be more of an obsession: “[...] to fly over the sensitive world, to dash yourself over all the experience, in another world, more perfect (sic!) – what do I say? – in as much as possible perfect (sic!). One believes that the imperfection is the sad monopoly of the *immanent world* and, on the contrary, the perfection is the natural right of transcendence” (Florian, 1943/ 2002, p. 226). Seen as such, the whole history of philosophy is reducible to a search for finding the appropriate relationship between knowledge, subject and object; or that between self and world, with its supreme entailment: immanence and transcendence.

The result of Florian’s analysis is pretty discouraging. As the history of philosophy cannot show any significant system firmly based only on the concept of transcendence, it remains to be concluded that the transcendent is practically null from the theoretical point of view; it is only a pure act of *believing*. There is no such kind of experience that can guarantee the access to the transcendent (Florian, 1943/ 2002, p. 233, 234).

In contradiction to Florian’s pessimistic view, whose concluding words were meant to bury once and for all the issue of transcendence, D. Isac reopens it on a rather optimistic basis. Thus, Isac gives the transcendence a new chance of living, on the argument that, in spite of numerous critical arguments brought against it over the centuries, nobody succeeded to formulate a decisive argument against its existence. On the contrary, philosophy remains above all a metaphysical thinking, a thinking living with the highest intensity in the area of Transcendence (Isac, 1943/ 2014, p. 24).

Therefore, the spiritual thought of mankind has not yet proven the inexistence of something like Transcendence. To conclude in such a manner (i.e., to dismiss its subject for good) means to rush into a judgment based on what was said up until that point. Isac casts light on the mission of the human spirit, which is that of searching for something not given in empirical sense-data and far more important than it. To speculate on the conundrums and hidden places of Transcendence is, therefore, the specifics of human spiritual consciousness; to give up means its condemnation to death. Stylistically and existentially, the human being can only fulfil and value him/ herself by the intellectual effort made through metaphysical speculation (Isac, 1943/ 2014, p. 41).

Through a fine and argued “critics of the criticism”, which skilfully synthesises transcendental idealism (in epistemology) and ontological realism (in ontology), D. Isac reaches an original “synthetic” solution: *the realist-critical philosophy of transcendence*, able to give an account for both the activity of consciousness and the external reality.

The conclusion of *Knowledge and Transcendence* is that a point-blank separation of *immanence* from *transcendence*, as *Critique of Pure Reason* prescribes it, becomes impossible. And this is because the humankind itself together with the cosmos participates in transcendence, this being an expression of it. Kant's contradictions must be now resolved and overridden. Philosophy cannot refuse itself the transcendence without risking becoming a religion without God. As Mircea Eliade would later prove that the *sacred* becomes manifest through *profane*, *phenomena* are ways of *transcendence's* epiphany, which does not mean, however, that the human being will one day be able to effectively know the absolute as such. "Human spirit, as well as the nature surrounding it, is an expression of the high transcendent existence, therefore a means through which we can raise questions and suspicions about what there is *over there* [we underline – I.I.]. In this concern, we might say, on one side, that the singularity and isolation of human being into nature is a phenomenon less tragic than commonly stressed. Springing from transcendence, the reason, the meaning and the noblest experiences of the human soul must have «beyond» a correspondence, a root which, even if it is not of the same nature, it signifies their justification" (Isac, 1943/ 2003, p. 349).

From the perspective of a desired completed philosophical system, the Romanian philosopher Lucian Blaga accused the insufficiency of Kant's criticism. The philosopher of Königsberg, the one who believed to have demonstrated once and for all *the impossibility of metaphysics as a science*, lays the blame to remain the prisoner of an undeclared metaphysical outlook. The ontological demarcation made by Blaga between the existence of the human being in the practical-sensible world for the purpose of auto-conservation (with its associated so-called knowledge of the "1<sup>st</sup> kind") and the named "existence in the horizon of mystery and for its revelation" (with a specific knowledge of the "2<sup>nd</sup> kind") spots the Kantian epistemology at the first level. The second one embraces the theories which aim to the *transcendent*. They are orientated and shaped by historical, ethnical and local "*stylistic categories*", more precisely, by a "*stylistic matrix*". Beside Kant's categories, stylistic categories give to science a structure, represented through the forms and historical varieties of its evolution. Unavoidably, Blaga will reach the antipode of Kant's metaphysics, because while the philosopher of Lancrăm considers *the subjective representations about the absolute/ transcendent as knowledge*, the philosopher of Königsberg denies them this quality neatly.

The open disagreement of D. Isac with the main presuppositions of Blaga's philosophical system originates in the conviction of the necessity to maintain steadiness in thinking in the field of critical spirit. Also, Isac shares the ideal of metaphysics as a "*strenge Wissenschaft*" ("rigorous science"), as featured before him by Kant or Husserl. Therefore, an interpreter devoted to the requirements of philosophical criticism could find in Blagianian terms like "mystery", "Great Anonymous" or "transcendent censorship" nothing else than some beautiful

arbitrary conceptual construes, without a rational foundation. In the research of the ontological problems raised by the *Trilogy of Knowledge* – especially those belonging to “dogmatical method” – D. Isac writes: “Here, we must say it, the *metaphysician* Blaga has gone much too far in front of the *theorist of knowledge* or, in other words, it has been done a theory of knowledge leaving behind the critical positions which we consider absolutely necessary. As any other metaphysician, Blaga has forgotten that the concepts do not always cover reality and that, in all case, the standpoint for the philosophy of knowledge ought to be the discussion of the relationship between concepts and reality, the discussion of the existence itself of the transcendent” (Isac, 1938, p. 209). Being interested in the cognitive value of the above-mentioned epistemology, D. Isac has understood to set forth Blaga’s theory *from a critical point of view*, following the conviction that inside the critical thinking and not elsewhere one must search for the solidity and justification of every philosophy.

As sometimes there have been some allegations, I must emphasize that D. Isac has conducted the dialogue with L. Blaga with respect for the philosopher. He always had in mind Blaga’s *ideas*, not the *person* of Blaga. As an admirer of Blaga’s poems, D. Isac has highly appreciated them multiple times for their inner outstanding value (Isac, 1940, 1943).

The new interpretations come to confirm D. Isac’s point of view, by the idea that, in contrast with Kant, Blaga’s epistemology does not succeed to ensure the position of metaphysics; on the contrary, the metaphysical conclusion is nothing else than a consequence of epistemological premises, assuming all the risks (first of all, the claim to be a *knowledge of the transcendent*). However, there a historical “conciliation” of these two great philosophers (Kant and Blaga) might be possible: if we accept that the research of the “pure reason” would come along with the research of historical, ethnical and local determinations of reason. Thus, one would not have to launch in debate the existence and spiritual meaning of the attempts to elaborate representations about the transcendent, according to the conclusions of Kant’s criticism. What remains questionable is only the claim that the outcome of these aspirations would be *knowledge* in the proper meaning of the term (Flonta, 2004, p. 16, 17).

After an insightful study of the history of philosophy, as well as its most significant and influential interpreters, D. Isac has been led to the conclusion that there is a *meaning* of the extremely numerous philosophical theories which follow each other throughout time. They do not just come one after another arbitrarily, but there is a justification in their coming as such. Thus, the diverse conceptions of mankind’s philosophers are neither mutually exclusive nor meddled in. Their evolution, from ancient times up-to-date, has the role and the meaning to shape the *philosophical consciousness* of our day, which paves the way of philosophy to coherence, consistence and, above all, to the *metaphysical truth*. The comparison with “hard sciences” (mathematics, physics, chemistry etc.) leaves philosophy

unavoidably outnumbered; however, such a situation is not given once and for all, because it is namely the *critical spirit* that could re-open philosophy to the science and culture.

Eventually, what is to be kept in mind from all the history of philosophy? In order to draft the answer, D. Isac invokes and brings in front of us the seducing personality of Socrates: “If the shadow of immortal Socrates would be again among us and could again sound the people with his embarrassing questions, it would not take long, of course, until the time when, using his profound and ironic spirit, he could speak to us, as follows: «Now, I know too well what Descartes, Hume, Leibniz, Kant and all the others have thought about the knowledge of the world, the human being and prime truths, but still cannot see clearly, my beloved friends, what must think and is entitled to think about all these things somebody, whoever he or she might be. I can see philosophers and systems, but cannot see *the philosophy itself*, as my formerly helpless disciples were able to see a beautiful object or a beautiful being, but not *the beauty in itself*. Should we stay with the opinion that philosophy consists of the knowledge of what one man or another have thought about the supreme reality, or to sustain its right to be a true *science*, accessible for everybody’s learning, even if, eventually, we could reduce it to the finding that we do not know a big deal? ».

What are we going to answer back to Socrates, if he were to object to us – as natural –, that systems are only opinions with more or less carats of truth, when he expects from us the *knowledge* of things and the clear awareness of the measure we own? To the «history», therefore, we cannot send him back, because it is just the history the place where from he comes; afterwards, he asks from us not what one or another philosopher has said, but *what should anybody think that the truth in itself is* [we underline – I.I.]. We must show him what philosophy is as an amount of wisdom and knowledge, beyond and through the systems, as he was striving in the ancient times to find out what is the virtue, beyond a virtuous deed or another” (Isac, 1946, p. 22).

So, beyond what a certain philosopher or another has thought and created, it is the *philosophy itself* to an advantage because the critical spirit guides it towards *certainty*. This way, philosophy gets the capacity to make a *synthesis* of its all-perennial theories, trends and paradigms. If the reality is only *one* and *non-contradictory*, it follows that the knowledge about reality must have the same feature. Thus, we obtain a *criterion* for all philosophical systems in history. There is none of them to express completely the *metaphysical truth*, but many of them possess “parts” or “fragments” of it, which must be set into the light for the fulfilment of the great synthesis. An examination of the traditions and paradigms from Democritus to Kant and from Thales to Bergson shows two important elements for taking into account: *epistemological idealism/ transcendentalism* and *metaphysical/ ontological realism*. These are both liable to being mixed, in a very promising meta-philosophical perspective, even if they have different roots.

A synthesis thus achieved has its mission to “convert” transcendence in terms of knowledge. Not only the human subject imposes its *a priori* shapes on the matter of sensible intuition, but also these shapes are influenced by the structure of a known object: “Kant has said that the subject imposes its *a priori* shapes on the «matter», which comes from the world-in-itself. We are, however, entitled to pose a question to him: how could one explain the wonder of the concordance between matter and shape; how comes that the reality-in-itself is so obedient that lies itself in space and time without our least effort? The answer to this question has a meaning only if we acknowledge the process of «accommodation». Reality-in-itself does not disguise itself suddenly, it is not «transformed» because, properly speaking, knowledge does not exert any action on it. In the time – or maybe out of the time – in the order of *phenomena* or in the *ontos* area there has been settled some sort of «agreement» between the two elements of knowledge (Isac, 1946, p. 38). The enigmatic syntagm “out of the time” could be interpreted through the theory of non-symbolic phenomenology as signifying a pre-symbolic zone, which serves as a means of accommodation between the object-before-the-knowledge and the-subject-before-knowing (something). Their imbrications and correspondence are the result of some reciprocal “concessions”, writes D. Isac, which led to the formation of the intermediate world (the so-called “phenomenal”), a kind of existence *sui-generis* “between psychological and ontological”. If one continues this hermeneutical line, then the Transcendence as The Origin or The Primordial Abyss precedes Knowledge, while the non-symbolic phenomena (impossible to grasp over the habitual knowledge) “come out” through the lacuna of the common everyday phenomena. This means that the Transcendence is no more something to be found out there, far, far away, but nearer than one could imagine, just in front of our eyes, even inconceivable by a usual act of knowledge.

The boldness to propose such a project of philosophical synthesis was an anticipation of Constantin Noica’s idea about the major responsibility of Western philosophy: the conciliation between *transcendent* and *transcendental*. Even if the metaphysics of the XXth century has gone on the way of the critical analysis of language, still the conviction of D. Isac has the force to impress us today: “So, this is how the historical and systematical synthesis of philosophy is, however – against every pessimism or spirit of historicity – possible. Critical realism, in which we see the core of the future philosophical synthesis, will join the grand and perennial lines of the evolution and systematic philosophy: *epistemological idealism* and *ontological realism*” (Isac, 1946, p. 39).

We should mention in conclusion, that, in recent years, there have been published books in philosophy of science and ontology which tend to give reason to D. Isac’s anticipation. It seems that the “marriage” of epistemological transcendentalism with ontological realism is the most reasonable solution, at least for a mind who continues the inquiry for the external reality, i.e., for a new ontological model, as well as for a new ontology (Pârvu, 1990, 2001). Within this philosophical tradition, re-thinking of the ontological models and, generally speaking, the whole ontology, remains a must.

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